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Abstract 
 
This paper describes the main features of China's economic and industrial reforms and considers 
the key strategic issues which determine effectiveness in the transfer and management of 
technology.  It is based on investigations  being carried out by a team of British and Chinese 
researchers. These involve studies within government and other agencies as well as case study 
analyses of state-owned and joint venture enterprises.  A particular aspect of the investigations is 
that they concentrate on the situation in the traditional industrial areas of China which, unlike the 
Special Enterprise Zones, have not so far experienced the same levels of foreign investment and 
are seen as being more problematic in terms of their ability to absorb modern manufacturing 
technology.  The paper addresses three key issues that have emerged as being relevant across the 
areas of study: i) the formation of enterprise groups as a means of developing and facilitating 
technology transfer,  ii) the need for flexibility and diversification in response to emerging 
competitive and market conditions and iii) implications for industrial policy and enterprises of 
multiple imports of the same or similar technologies.  
 
Background to China's Economic Policy Reforms and Research Objectives 
 
Since China began its programme of economic and industrial reforms and opened its doors to 
the outside world in 1979, three main features of its industrial development can be identified: 
 
• a steadily growing inward flow of foreign investment; 
• a concerted effort by the government to revitalize the state owned industries; and 
• a burgeoning private industrial sector. 
 
China's stated aim is to sustain 10% growth per annum until the end of the century.  In 1985, 
80% of enterprises were state owned, but now more than 50 per cent are collectives, privately 
owned or foreign owned enterprises and joint ventures. About two hundred formerly state 
owned enterprises are now listed on the stock markets of Shanghai, Guangzhou and even 
some overseas exchanges. The role of foreign investment and imported technology and 
know-how has been important in industrial development in China and will continue to be so 
in the future. 
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This paper is based on part of a programme of research jointly carried out by a team of staff 
from the Business Schools of Aston University and the People's University of China since 
1989. The work has addressed the following aspects: 
 
(1) Chinese manufacturing enterprise management and institutional structures; 
(2) technological competence in Chinese enterprises; and 
(3) technology transfer and management in state enterprises and joint ventures. 
 
The next section introduces changes in the policy context which have led to the sharp 
increase in technology transfer into China and raised questions about the management of 
technology at the level of the enterprise. The following section develops a conceptual 
framework for examining three aspects related to technology management at the enterprise 
level. It also reports on the management issues which have emerged from the ongoing case 
study investigations in a number of enterprises. The final two sections then provide the 
preliminary conclusions and indications of future work. 
 
Industrial Policy and Technology Transfer 
 
China's policy on technology transfer has undergone a number of changes since the 1950s 
starting with turn-key projects, mainly supplied by the USSR, then with a shift to technology 
transfer from Japan, Western Europe and the United States during the 1970s, but mainly for 
large scale projects in heavy industries.  A government review of the technology transfer 
policy soon after the declaration of the "open door" in 1978 found the earlier approach 
lacking in a number of respects. Earlier projects were large and expensive and the potential 
for developing Chinese technological capability based on these was limited. Further, 
purchase of new equipment was the only channel for technology transfer. Since then, under 
the "open door" policy and subsequent phases of liberalisation, there has been a 
diversification of technology transfer channels [1].  
 
 
There has been accelerating growth in the number of foreign investment projects in China 
and each year has seen new records for the number of projects approved and their contract 
value.  During 1992 for example almost 47,000 foreign investment agreements with a 
contract value of more than US$68.5 billion were signed. This was more than the entire total 
over the previous thirteen years, during which period 44,000 foreign investment contracts 
were agreed with a value of US$52.3 billion. [2]. This record was again exceeded in just the 
first nine months of 1993 when a further 63,000 projects were approved with a value of 
US$83 billion [3].   
 
The point should be made, however, that contract value provides only one indicator of the 
amount of  investment in China and a more complete picture is provided by the actual utilised 
amount of the funds pledged.  In 1992, for example, the actual amount used was US$11 
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billion and in 1993 it was US$20 billion.   In 1994 the number and contract value of new 
projects declined sharply compared with the previous year, by 46% and 32% respectively, 
although the actual utilised investment rose by 49% [4].  
 
As far as the transfer of technology is concerned the actual utilised funds provide some 
indication of the amount that is transferred via foreign investment projects since a significant 
proportion of such projects include technology imports.  Not all technology is transferred 
through foreign investments, however,  a substantial amount being imported by wholly 
Chinese owned enterprises. Technology imports have followed a similar pattern to foreign 
investments and in the first half of 1992 they reached an all time high of about US$14 billion 
(120% increase over the same period in the previous year). 
 
The Nature of Technology Transfer 
 
There is much discussion and debate about what precisely constitutes 'technology transfer'. 
Much of the technology transferred under foreign investment agreements and technology 
imports simply amounts to a 'one shot' introduction of hardware and knowledge and earlier 
research has often tended to concentrate on straight technology imports into China [5].  
Within the context of the authors' research technology, transfer is defined as a more complex 
long term process of developing technological capability [6].   There are a number of direct 
and indirect ways in which transfer may be facilitated including licensing, joint ventures, and 
direct exchange.   
 
An important question which arises when conducting research of this nature is whether 
subsequent, repeat, transfers of hardware and software can still be regarded as  'technology 
transfer'.  In previous technology transfer research it would usually by regard as not. 
However, in a country as large as China, where technical communications are poorly 
developed, several enterprises may import the same or similar technology without having 
access to the previously acquired knowledge of others.  In this situation, where each 
enterprise is handling what, to them, is a new form of technology, the term 'technology 
transfer' can still apply, and for the purpose of this research such transfers are included. In 
conducting the research, however, care was needed to ensure this wider interpretation was 
understood by the participating enterprises and other agencies involved.  For example the 
Ministry of  Machine Building Industry in China keeps separate data for 'technology transfer' 
(transfer of software or hardware with embedded software, but for the first time only) and 
'equipment transfer' (subsequent transfers of hardware, regardless of whether it has any 
embedded software).      
 
Of particular significance to this research are also the wide regional differences that have 
emerged and  considerations to be taken into account as a consequence [7]. For example 
much of the growth in China's coastal areas is based on technology aimed at taking advantage 
of lower labour costs while in other parts of the country efforts are being made to craft 
technology transfer and development within strategic industries such as automotive 
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manufacture.  
 
The diversity of technology transfer channels and the liberal policy regime have raised a 
number of issues in relation to the management of technology at the level of an industry and 
an enterprise. This paper addresses the following three technology management issues: 
 
• formation of enterprise groups as a means of developing and facilitating technology 
 transfer within industrial sectors; 
• the need for flexibility and diversification as a strategic response to emerging 
 competitive and market conditions, and 
• implications for industrial policy and enterprises of multiple imports of the same or 
 similar technologies. 
 
Technology Strategy in Chinese Industrial Enterprises 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
In examining technology transfer and its management, an important aspect is whether it has 
been effectively implemented technically. However, in an increasingly competitive 
environment commercial viability is an equally important consideration. 
Both these aspects are affected by: 
 
(1) the technical and management capabilities in the enterprise;  
(2) whether the transfer was motivated by technology push or market pull; 
(3) market conditions (e.g. market size, competition and access to markets and 
 customers); 
(4) the type of technology transfer agreement and the service provided by the supplier; 
(5) technology complexity, capital intensity and the end product's position in the 
 supply chain; 
(6) government policies, incentives and services; and  
(7) availability of finance. 
 
For examining technological capability at the enterprise level and the contribution it makes to 
the overall strategy of the enterprise the concept of the value chain is useful  [8]. Technology 
development is one of the major activities in the value chain. It may contribute to the 
improvement of competitiveness by reducing costs or developing new products and providing 
access to new markets. In traditional Chinese enterprises, as technology transfer plays an 
important part in the process of technology development, the enterprise has to develop links 
with its suppliers as a means of developing a competitive strategy. More generally, an 
enterprise is typically part of a network of other enterprises which are suppliers of technology 
and other inputs together with customers, thereby forming a "value system". Figure 1 
provides a conceptual framework for the examination of the case studies by placing an 
enterprise within the context of the network of linkages with suppliers and customers and the 
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policy framework. The figure also provides an overview of the research methodology being 
used in this project. 
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework for case study examination and project methodology 
 
 
In industrial operations where the production of parts, sub-assemblies, and final assembly can 
be easily separated there is usually an established and easy to use technology available.  The 
value of parts is often high in relation to their bulk and weight and the coordination function 
will be well organised by a single enterprise or group. Technology can be transferred to a 
country offering cost advantages but will usually be fairly basic. In terms of the network 
illustrated in Figure 1, the advantages of such operations are the close coordination between 
the enterprises in the value system. The supplier of technology may also be the customer, 
thus reducing the problems of coordination, management of technology and finding markets. 
 
 
A similar situation exists where the technology supplier provides a well established 
technology such as an assembly line for producing  end-products with low variation, such as 
television sets. The key links are with suppliers of the essential components which the 
recipient firm cannot produce.  For  consumer products, or end products such as minibuses, 
links with the market are not very complex. 
 
Other types of technology transfer, such as that necessary to upgrade the manufacture of 
automobile engines for example, offers a sharp contrast to the above. Here production is a 
capital intensive and complex process with high development costs. Engine production 
requires a complex network of suppliers of materials, components and tools. It is also in the 
middle of the supply chain for the final product which itself requires a large network of 
suppliers. If the engine plant is not part of an integrated enterprise producing vehicles, a 
number of coordination and strategy issues also arise.   
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1) The firm's configuration of functions, services and capabilities (e.g. logistics, 
technological capability etc.) may not enable production of engines to the required 
specifications and in sufficient numbers.    
 
2) The market for the engines is a problem. Present customers of the existing engine models 
may not be the right customers for the new engines. The new product may be too expensive 
and too high a quality. Other potential customers are established automobile manufacturers 
operating in joint ventures. They will typically have developed their own engines or will have 
established suppliers of engines designed specifically for their vehicles.    
 
3) Therefore for such a venture to succeed, an engine manufacturing company may either 
have to integrate forward into making vehicles or, before making the investment decision, 
have clearly established customers. In the terminology of the value chain and value system, 
acquiring the technology to upgrade the engine requires the establishment of a new value 
chain. The coordination function for the value system is also more difficult when compared 
with that for the off-shore type operations. In addition with a new and complex technology, 
there are problems of implementation, requirement of  specialist imported inputs and 
software inputs. 
 
Enterprise group formation 
 
The creation of enterprise groups was an important part of the Chinese government's 
economic reforms during the 1980s and represented a radical departure from the traditional 
arrangement where every enterprise was an individual workshop under the control of industry 
ministries and local bureaux.  About 2,000 groups had emerged by the end of 1989 [9].  In 
terms of structure, around 20 percent of enterprise groups were formed around one big 
enterprise and brought about by mergers, share purchasing, responsibility contracting and 
leasing.   The development of groups has been part of the Government's plan to rationalise 
manufacturing and improve its efficiency. In the automotive industry for example there were 
over one hundred automobile assembly factories by the end of the 1980s, more than the 
combined total of Japan, the United States, Germany, Britain, France and Italy.   The 
formation of the Jiefang and Dongfeng Automobile Groups based on the old Number 1 and 
Number 2 Automotive Works has started to resolve the problem of small-scale overlapping 
production of medium sized trucks. 
 
Case examples of enterprise groups 
 
Bei Nei Group - This group comprises a network of factories making engines and 
components and is one of a number of diesel engine manufacturers given approval to develop 
automobile engines by the Ministry of Machine Building Industry [10] .  At Bei Nei, product 
technology has been transferred from the former Soviet Union, Germany and Japan. More 
recently product and process technology has been transferred from General Motors in the 
USA in the form of a facility for manufacturing a new four cylinder light petrol engine. The 
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group is highly dependent on the BN492, an engine of old design, used in light trucks and 
'jeeps' and its formation has facilitated shared knowledge about this engine which is made in 
several plants.  The GM engine is eventually intended to replace the BN492 , although cost of 
production due to low production volumes has proved a barrier to finding customers and, 
paradoxically, sales need to be improved before costs can be decreased. 
  
Sales along the value chain had been considered a possibility since GM is a partner in a joint 
venture company making light trucks and cars in Shenyang [11]. However, the research 
team's subsequent investigations at the joint venture revealed that several technical and 
commercial difficulties stood in the way of this opportunity.  Most newer vehicles made in 
China involve foreign JV partners so this has created problems of market access for 
indigenous engine manufacturers. Creating horizontally integrated groups does not prove to 
be the solution in such cases since they do not facilitate access to downstream customers, the 
manufacturers of end products. 
 
Beijing Peony Electronic Group -  Based around the Beijing TV Factory this group was 
formed via mergers with a screen factory and the Dong Fong TV Factory.  Both the latter two 
factories were weak but the merger has helped to improve their efficiency. The group's 
strategy is i) enlargement ii) quality improvement iii) export expansion. Its success partly 
results from a partnership with Panasonic for technology transfer (product and process).   
Since the group was formed it has established a new communications equipment company to 
make paging machines and operate networks.  It has also formed a joint venture with a 
Korean company (Goldstar) to develop and manufacture a new range of lower cost 
televisions.  Television set manufacture is fiercely competitive and the formation of a group 
enables greater economies of scale.  
 
The Beijing Peony Electronic Group has capacity to produce 1 million television sets per 
year and its current annual output is 800,000.  Most are sold in China under the brand names 
'Peony' and 'Mudan' and the group has almost 9% market share.  Its main competitors are TV 
factories in Tianjin ('Beijing' brand), Nanjing ('Panda' brand),  Shanghai ('Goldstar' brand) 
and Mianyang, Sichuan Province ('Cheng Hong' or 'Rainbow' brand).  The Mianyang factory, 
which is also part of a group, is considered to be the greatest threat. It produced 1.7 million 
TV sets in 1994 and has the capacity to produce 2 million.  Its output has enabled the cost of 
production to be brought down and prices are consequentially lower than for competitor 
brands.     
 
Flexibility and diversification as a strategic response to emerging competitive and 
market conditions 
 
Under centralised planning the concepts of flexibility and diversification were virtually non-
existent but the industrial reforms quickly placed new demands on enterprises that forced 
them to become more flexible and adaptable. However, these demands could only partially be 
answered using techniques and technologies from established market economics and China's 
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unique flexibility requirements necessitated a special approach [12].   A particular 
consequence of the reforms, which makes special demands of Chinese enterprise 
management, is the trend towards diversification into new business areas.  This has been 
prompted by a number of factors including:  
 
1) the greater operational autonomy that had been acquired by Chinese enterprises.  
2) the establishment of a 'socialist market economy' where demand pull now determines the 
output from an enterprise. 
3) the reduction in military equipment requirements which has adversely affected numerous 
enterprises in the aerospace, electronics and mechanical equipment sectors. 
4) the need to find work for 'redundant' employees who are no longer protected by enterprises 
social obligations. 
5) the rationalisation of enterprises which has taken place under enterprise group formation. 
6) the reduction in state funding of academies and institutes which has caused them to seek 
alternative sources of revenue. 
 
The extent to which diversification has occurred within enterprises and industries is so great 
that some ministries are now responsible for large areas of the economy that are not within 
the official scope of their administration.  There are some extreme examples.  For instance an 
entire watch factory, under the Ministry of Light Industry, has completely turned itself over 
to retailing and has become a departments store, and the Capital Iron and Steel Works, under 
the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, has become a conglomerate involved in producing a 
wide range of goods and services. 
  
Case examples of flexibility and diversification 
 
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp. - CAC was originally founded to manufacture jet fighters 
and military production still represents about 80% by value. However, cuts in orders have 
necessitated a move towards the manufacture of civilian products as a means of utilising 
capacity.  Within its core business diversification has involved a contract with McDonnell 
Douglas to produce MD82 noses, necessitating improved quality and increased efficiency.  
Outside its core business diversification includes production of: automobile press moulds, 
motorcycles, dry cleaning machines, hydraulic engineering products (eg car jacks), water 
heaters, satellite dishes and wheelchairs. Some of these are market-led and others are 
technology-led products. 
 
In the case of CAC its diversification activities are part of a seven year product development 
programme supported by the Chinese government. It has been set a specific target to reduce 
its military production to 60% by the end of the programme period.  
 
Chinese Academy of Sciences -   The Academy, described as China's supreme natural 
sciences academic organ, is a comprehensive centre for research. It comprises 122 institutes 
employing 50,000 technical and scientific personnel [13]. Originally funded wholly by the 
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Government, the CAS was set-up to conduct basic research but its brief was later enlarged to 
include applied research and production, which could generate income to offset cuts in 
government funding.   
 
The Institute of Semiconductors under the CAS is an example of a body which has been 
required increasingly to become self financing. It manufactures and markets laser devices for 
use in fibre optic communications.  More recent cuts in Government funding, together with 
the tendency for more research to be carried out by enterprises and private institutes, have 
compelled CAS institutes to become even more commercially minded. This in turn has 
encouraged the Institute of  Semiconductors to diversify, often by forming joint ventures.  
For example one joint venture, with a Japanese company, produces passive infra-red 
detectors (PIRs) for use in security equipment.  Other more recent examples of diversification 
have involved a move into services. They include a joint venture with a British company to 
provide a commissioning service for engineering projects.  The institute has also become 
involved in providing advice on the installation of hotel security systems.     
 
Implications of multiple imports of the same or similar technologies 
 
The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy has been accompanied by a flood of imported 
technology.  It was mentioned earlier that a feature of Chinese industry has been the 
proliferation of small-scale enterprises with overlapping production.  This in turn has led to 
multiple imports of the same or similar technology.   
 
Whether these multiple imports are the result of a specific intention or simply because of 
division of responsibilities for policy between different levels of government is not 
completely clear. However, a debate has been prompted in China about whether multiple 
imports of technology create a healthy competitive environment or inefficient and haphazard 
industrial growth.   The situation also demonstrates the clash that exists between different 
economic ideologies, with one advocating the retention of strong central planning and the 
other favouring more decentralisation.       
 
Examples of industries with multiple technology imports 
 
Colour TV manufacture -  Here there have been multiple imports of product and process 
technology from Japan, Europe and the USA.  By 1989 there were 113 colour television 
production lines installed in China [14] and 12 million sets were produced and only 5.4 
million sold during 1991 [15]. Weaker companies have come under pressure from stronger 
ones, the difference often being based on the origin of the technology transferred.  In general, 
firms acquiring their technology from Sanyo have been less successful (such as the Chengdu 
TV factory in Sichuan and the Dong Fong factory in Beijing) while those using National 
technology have been more competitive (such as the Beijing Peony Group and the Mianyang 
factory).  Many of the weaker companies have virtually ceased production, while others, such 
as Dong Fong, have been absorbed by stronger ones.  
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Minibus manufacture -  The main technology transfer project in this industry has been from 
Daihatsu to the Tianjin Minibus Works which has now been extended to include the Charade 
car.  Other Japanese minibus producers such as Isuzu and Suzuki, have more that one co-
operation in China; hence there are many factories producing minibuses but with relatively 
few Japanese companies involved.  The market for minibuses continues to increase so, unlike 
the CTV industry, saturation point does not yet appear to have been reached.   
 
Part of the reason for there being multiple imports into several factories is that, in common 
with TV production, almost every province in China wanted to develop its own automotive 
industry and, as a consequence, there are now 125 automobile makers in the country.  The 
Chinese Government has allowed this situation to persist because, among other things, it 
encouraged competition between manufacturers. At the same time, however, it has criticised 
the inefficient use of resources that can result, so now a programme of rationalisation has 
begun [16,17]. 
 
Conclusions   
 
Formation of enterprise groups provides scope for importing large scale complex technology 
such as automated production lines but the difficulty of finding markets implies that 
enterprises may have to develop cooperation at a number of levels with technology providers 
and end product manufacturers to ensure commercial success.  The case of Bei Nei illustrates 
this very well, where a technically sound product has so far failed because insufficient 
account was taken of market factors.  
 
Constraints on diversification include managerial capability and permission to operate with 
freedoms not normally given to state enterprises.  The opportunistic diversification found in a 
number of enterprises is understandable at an early stage of industrial reorientation but it is 
necessary to make strategic assessments of the diversification options. The success of the 
diversification approach needs a longer term view which leads enterprises away from less 
profitable, technology led, opportunistic, activities  to those which are more profitable and 
within their resource constraints. 
 
In some industries (eg television and minibus manufacture), multiple imports of similar 
technologies have created a market situation which occurs at the early stage of a product life 
cycle.  It has been argued that multiple imports of technology are wasteful. However, 
advantages may emerge from the competitive situation and subsequent restructuring of 
industries.   
 
After a period in which the Chinese government appeared to allow a 'free for all' in terms of 
enterprise creation and technology transfer, there are now signs that a strategy is being 
developed where a relatively small number of enterprises are the focus for development of a 
particular industry.  The automotive industry has been among the first to be subject to such a 
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strategy and the electronics industry seems to be formulating a similar approach.   Obstacles 
to rationalisation will be difficult to overcome, however, such as the reluctance of provincial 
governments to lose control of factories and the social responsibilities felt by managers 
which lead them to protect jobs. 
 
Government policy has important implications for the willingness to undertake technology 
transfer and the methods for technology transfer at the enterprise level. For example, joint 
ventures are favoured over other methods of technology transfer because of preferential 
policies on taxation, exchange controls etc.  Purchase of hardware is preferred over licensing 
only (i.e. buying technology without hardware) because this approach leads to the sort of 
short-term results that have often been demanded under China's "contract responsibility 
system". 
 
Future Work  
 
The three technology management issues described in this paper have emerged as a result of 
the research team's preliminary investigations within government and other agencies as well 
as several enterprises and groups.  Subsequent  investigations have focused on the longer-
term developments within selected industries, such as machinery and electronics, using the 
described framework.  The studies are also being extended forwards and backwards to 
include end-customers and foreign suppliers of technology.  
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